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This paper studies the determination of trade policy by considering an 
imperfect competitive market. The model adopts the political process de-
veloped by Grossman and Helpman (1994), but it also takes into account 
a different economic structure, which is based on the Footloose Capital 
model. Two new appealing insights come from the consideration of mono-
polistic competition. Firstly, in this setting the interest group seems to be 
more worried to persuade the government to set a high tariff when it can 
charge a low mark-up. Secondly, the initial distribution of industry might 
also infl uence the structure of protection in one economy.
Keywords: Endogenous trade policy; Monopolistic competition; Trade; Eco-
nomic geography.
JEL classifi cation: F12, F13, R30.
Rൾඌඎආൾඇ
La autora estudia la determinación de la política comercial en un marco de 
competencia imperfecta. El modelo incorpora el proceso político desarrol-
lado por Grossman and Helpman (1994), teniendo en cuenta una estructura 
económica diferente, basada en el modelo Footloose Capital. Dos nuevas 
predicciones surgen al considerar competencia imperfecta. En primer 
lugar, en este marco, un lobby parece estar más preocupado en persuadir al 
gobierno de aplicar un arancel elevado cuando puede cargar al precio un 
bajo mark-up. En segundo lugar, la distribución inicial de la fi rma puede 
infl uir en la estructura de protección en una economía.   
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I. Iඇඍඋඈൽඎർඍංඈඇ
Quite often incumbent governments design economic policies con-
sidering not only the general well-being of societies but also their own po-
litical interests. Trade policies are one of the various sets of tools that policy 
makers have at hand to pursue their political objectives. This set comprises 
instruments of ad-valorem nature, quantity restrictions and a complex and 
diversifi ed range of non-tariff barriers. Trade policies affect individuals’ 
wealth, serving as frequent instruments to redistribute incomes among dif-
ferent groups in the society. Governments favor some interest groups by 
protecting them from foreign competition; while, at the same time, nega-
tively affect others agents of a community.
During the three last decades, theoretical and empirical research has 
focused in analyzing the political process from which the structure of trade 
protection is determined. The Grossman and Helpman (1994) model is the 
prominent framework that explains the formation of trade policy in a rep-
resentative democracy. This political-support approach has the interesting 
characteristic of providing micro-foundations to the player’s actions, which 
are less formally specifi ed in previous political economy models. The political 
process is developed by considering perfect competition. During the last 
decades, this core background has been extended in several ways.1 
Chang (2005) is one of the fi rst attempts to analyze the determination of 
trade policy in an alternative market structure. This model adopts the polit-
ical process developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994), but it takes into 
account the Krugman-Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competitive model. Two 
new insights, which are somewhat different from predictions of the core 
model under perfect competition, arise from this extension. Interestingly, an 
organized export sector may be affected by either an export subsidy or an 
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1. Bombardini (2008), Facchini et al. (2006), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Gawande, et al. 
(2006) and Mitra (1999) present interesting theoretical extensions of the core model.
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export tax. Moreover, the inverse of import penetration positively affects the 
level of endogenous tariff, regardless the political status of the productive 
sector. The author concludes that these differences in predictions suggest 
that endogenous levels of protection vary with the characteristics of the in-
dustrial sector, i.e. the market structures.
Facchini et al. (2010) have extended the Grossman and Helpman 
(1994) model by allowing different degrees of substitutability between do-
mestically produced and imported goods in an ad hoc manner. The model relies 
on the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic model but introduces different degree of 
substitutability between differentiated goods vis á vis different source countries. 
The main prediction is that higher levels of protection in small economies 
are explained by a higher degree of substitutability between domestic and 
imported varieties. 
Alternatively, Ossa (2013) has developed a general equilibrium 
framework of trade, which is based on the traditional model of Ricardo 
(1817), the monopolistic competition setting of Krugman (1980) and the 
core model of political economy.2 The model serves to introduce a novel 
quantitative analysis of non-cooperative and cooperative trade policy; the 
quantitative application is a multi-regional and multi-industrial study for 
a big country; it hands estimations of the United States tariffs.3 One of the 
main results is that estimates of optimal tariffs, which are computed by tak-
ing as given all other countries’ factual tariffs, are decreasing in the elastici-
ty of substitution due to the profi t shifting effect.4 The intuitive explanation 
posed by the author is that lower elasticities give the United States more 
monopoly power in world markets, which it optimally exploits by setting 
higher tariffs. The negative relationship between tariffs and the elasticity of 
substitution is also present when Nash tariffs are computed.5  When cooper-
ative tariff are estimated, the relationship reverses; world cooperative tariffs 
are negative for those industries that evidence the lowest elasticities and 
increases strongly for industries with high elasticity of substitution.
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2.  The author introduces government’s preferences as a reduced form of the incumbent’s objective 
function specifi ed in Grossman and Helpman (1994). The numerical exercise computes the poli-
tical economy weights using estimates of Goldberg and Maggi (1999).
3.  The author considers 7 regions, which are Brazil, China, the European Union, India, Japan, the 
United States and the Rest of the World, and 26 manufacturing industries. 
4.  As industries’ mark ups are constants, the profi t shifting effect captures changes in country i’’s 
welfare due to changes in country i’’s aggregate profi ts originated in changes of industry output.
5.  In this case, countries optimally retaliate.
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The present paper contributes the study of determination of trade 
policy within a monopolistic competitive framework. It presents a back-
ground introduced in Gáname (2005) and based on the political-support 
model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) that, though similar in nature to 
those models presented in Chang (2005), Facchini et al. (2010) and Ossa 
(2013), considers another economic structure based on the Footloose Capi-
tal model (Martin and Rogers, 1995). The Footloose Capital model (hence-
forth, FC) belongs to the New Economic Geography branch; it is the most 
tractable model among the economic geography settings. Hence, this paper 
aims to explore whether the fashion of the market structure may provide some 
new predictions.
 
In fact, the setting developed hands two new appealing insights that 
come from the consideration of monopolistic competition. Firstly, the inter-
est group seems to be more worried to persuade the government to set a high 
tariff when it can charge a low mark-up. This insight is in line with the ar-
gument presented in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007). The authors show 
that asymmetric appropriablity of rents is the reason why interest groups 
fi ght harder to avoid losses. Secondly, the initial distribution of industry 
might also infl uence the structure of protection in one economy. On the one 
hand, the presence of a high number of fi rms in the economy involves a 
tough level of competition among them, which tends to erode the potential 
gains that capital owners would derive from the protectionist policy. In this 
situation, lobbying activity might become less fruitful. On the other hand, 
if the number of fi rms might refl ect a measure of lobby’s political power, 
a higher number of fi rms will magnify the potential gains of protection. 
Hence, the lobby would be more willing to bid for protection.
This note is structured as follows. Section II presents the formal back-
ground, in which economic and political behaviors are specifi ed. Section III 
introduces interesting insights that emerge from the political game when 
the spatial distribution of fi rms is taken as given, i.e. a short run analysis. 
Section IV gives the concluding remarks. Annex A presents the equilibrium 
of the spatial distribution of fi rms when trade costs (included trade policy) are 
considered exogenous. Finally, Annex B shows the comparative static analysis. 
 II. Tඁൾ ඍඁൾඈඋൾඍංർൺඅ Fඋൺආൾඐඈඋ඄
This section presents the main features of the model as well as a 
description of agents’ preferences over trade policy, the specifi cation of how 
Mൺඋටൺ Cൾർංඅංൺ Gගඇൺආൾ
Rൾඏංඌඍൺ ൽൾ Eർඈඇඈආටൺ ඒ Eඌඍൺൽටඌඍංർൺ | Vඈඅ. LII | N° 1| (2014) | ඉඉ. 87-112 | ISSN 0034-8066 | e-ISSN 2451-7321
 91
these preferences are aggregated into political demands and the govern-
ment’s objective function. 
II.1 The economic structure
As it was mentioned above, the economic structure takes the form of 
the FC model which takes into account two economies, two sectors and two 
productive factors. One of the assumptions introduced is that one economy 
is small and represents the home country while the other is a large region 
and can be viewed as the rest of the world. They have similar tastes and 
technologies. The production structure is characterized by two different 
sectors, the industrial sector, which is considered as the modern one and the 
agricultural traditional sector. On the one hand, the industrial sector pro-
duces a number of varieties under increasing returns to scale and fi rms com-
pete monopolistically. On the other hand, the agricultural sector produces a 
homogeneous good under constant return to scale and perfect competition. 
This good is traded without frictions; while differentiated goods are traded 
between countries with frictions and trade costs are modeled á la iceberg. 
The two economies are endowed with two factors, physical capital and la-
bor. While the manufacture activity uses both factors, the agriculture sector 
only employs labor. In the short-run capital factor cannot migrate from one 
economy to the other. Labor is the inter-sectoral mobile factor and is also 
considered as immobile between regions.
The two economies are populated by individuals with identical pref-
erences though different endowments. The typical consumer of the small 
economy maximizes the following quasi-linear Dixit-Stiglitz utility func-
tion:6
(1)
where cA denotes the consumption of the agricultural good, which is chosen 
to be the numeraire good. ci and  c
_
   i* are, respectively, the domestic and for-
eign differentiated industrial good i consumed by a representative resident 
of the small economy, and n and n* are the numbers of varieties produced 
domestically and abroad, respectively.7  Thus, the total number of varieties 
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6.  The rest of the world has an identical economic structure. All variables of the large economy are 
denoted by an asterisk.
7.  One of the results in the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model is that there is one fi rm per 
variety and one variety per fi rm.
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available in both regions equals N= n+n*. μ represents the expenditure on 
all varieties and σ > 1 is a parameter that stands for both the own price and 
substitution constant elasticities.8
The total expenditure that a typical individual devotes to all sorts of 
goods is given by the amount E. With quasi-linear preferences, the demand 
functions of local and foreign goods, ci and  c
_
   i* , are given by the following 
expressions:
                                          and                                                 (2)
where pi denotes the price of the local differentiated good i,  p
_
    i*  stands for the 
price of the foreign differentiated good i and                                               
is the average price that prevails in the home economy.
Hence, demands depend on the level of its own prices as well as on 
the level of the average price; the smaller the average price, the lower the de-
mand of a particular variety. Equations (2) also show that when the intensity 
of preferences for differentiated goods strengthens, i.e. μ increases, demands 
of varieties augment. The demand function of the numeraire good is equal to:
cA = E − μ                                             (3)
Equations (2) and (3) represent the optimal choices of an individual in 
terms of consumption. The corresponding indirect utility function takes the form:
(4)
where s (P) = [ ln (P−1μ) ] − μ accounts for the consumer surplus that each indi-
vidual derives from the consumption of goods.
The two productive sectors use different technologies. The technology 
in the agricultural sector is modeled as simple as possible. This sector uses 
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8.  Preferences are modeled by taking into account a sub-utility function that imposes diminishing 
marginal utility of expenditure on differentiated good; the advantage of this modelling strategy 
is that one avoids the problem of indeterminacy of expenditure allocation. For more details, see 
Baldwin et al. (2003).
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only labor to produce the traditional good under constant returns to scale. It 
requires one unit of labor to produce one unit of the numeraire good, aA=1. 
The aggregate supply of labor is suffi cient to ensure a positive supply of this 
good. As a result of these assumptions, the wage rate of labor, w, equals 1. 
Labor factor is considered to be immobile across regions but mobile across 
sectors.
The industrial sector exhibits increasing return to scale. A typical fi rm 
faces a cost function which is not homothetic.9  The fi xed cost includes the 
reward of capital while the variable cost involves the retribution of labor:
TC = πK + amc Xw                                        (5)
where π is the reward of capital, amc is the input-output requirement of labor 
and  X = X+ X
_
   is the total supply of a typical fi rm, X is supplied at home, 
while X
_
    is offered abroad. To keep the cost structure in a simple fashion, it 
is assumed that each fi rm requires only one unit of physical capital, that is 
K=1 .10
Each fi rm can sell its production in the local market or abroad. 
When domestic varieties are sold in the large region, local fi rms face an 
iceberg trade cost, τ*. For simplicity, in this paper, the iceberg trade cost 
only comprises an ad-valorem tariff, t*, which is set by the foreign govern-
ment; hence,τ* = (1+ t*). Similarly, when a foreign firm wants to sell its 
production in the small economy, it faces a trade cost τ = (1+ t)  that 
consists of an ad-valorem tariff, t, which is introduced by the do-
mestic government; in this setting τ = (1+ t) arises endogenously. The 
maximization problem of a local firm gives the following pair of prices:.
   and                                                        (6)
where pi is the price of the domestic variety i that prevails in the small 
economy and p
_
  i is the price of the domestic variety i that prevails in 
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9.  The factor intensity of the fi xed cost differs from the factor intensity of the variable cost (Baldwin 
et al., 2003: p. 71).
10. As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), the production structure consists of two productive sectors; 
one sector produces the homogeneous good under constant returns to scale using only the mobile 
factor. Due to assumptions related to this sector, the wage rate is fi xed at one; hence, the rewards 
to capital factor adjust to absorb the operating surplus of a fi rm that produces a variety under 
increasing returns to scale. 
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the large economy.           denotes the mark-up that a local fi rm charges 
above the marginal cost, given by amc. Firms have the same marginal cost 
and the elasticity of substitution, σ, is the same for every pair of varieties. 
Hence, domestic varieties that are sold at the local market are equally priced 
(i.e. pi = p). Also one can see that  p
_
 i = τ*pi and p
_
 i = p
_
   = τ*p . Similarly, foreign 
fi rms maximize benefi ts; the maximization problem gives the prices for each 
foreign variety i in each market:
   and                                                        (7)
where pi*  is the price of the foreign variety that prevails in the foreign 
economy and p
_
 i* accounts for the price of the foreign variety that prevails 
domestically. In this case, pi* = p*, p
_
 i*  = p
_
 * and p
_
 * =τ p* . Moreover, since the 
economies are assumed to have the same technology in every sector, amc=a*mc, 
domestic and foreign varieties have the same price in domestic and foreign 
markets respectively, that is p = p*. However, an asymmetry in prices between 
both regions arises since trade policy applied by governments is generally 
different, p
_
   ≠  p
_
 * .
As it was remarked previously, this paper assumes only one sort of 
trade policy instrument. Hence, in the small economy, the policy-maker 
only may infl uence internal prices of varieties by introducing an ad-valorem 
import tariff, t.11  The government introduces a wedge between the internal 
and foreign prices if it decides to set a tariff. The tax revenue that the incum-
bent derives from this policy, in per capita terms, is given by:
(8)
 The government redistributes the tax income equally among individ-
uals. Individuals also derive income from alternative sources. Each resident 
derives income as owner of one unit of labor and also, possibly, as owner of 
capital factor. It is assumed that individuals may have at most one unit of cap-
ital. Those individuals that own physical capital will perceive that their in-
comes are infl uenced by the external competition of foreign varieties. For this 
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11. The model features a shortcoming in this respect, since does not formally consider a wider ran-
ge of trade policy instruments and the proper selection mechanism that government may apply. 
Though Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Chang (2005) take into account a wider set of ins-
truments, authors circumscribe them to a sub-set of trade policy such as ad-valorem taxes and 
subsidies applied on exports as well as on imports.
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reason, they will be interested to prevent such competition via a tariff applied 
to them. A higher tariff increases the average price of the small economy since
and  p
_
 * =τ p* . As it can
be seen from equation (2), a higher average price tends to increase the de-
mand of each local differentiated good, which of course favors local fi rms.
II.2 The political game
The study focuses on the short-run period; hence, capital cannot fl ow 
from one region to the other in order to look for higher rewards. In the short 
run, other strategies can be taken in order to increase benefi ts; capital owners 
may have an economic incentive that drives them to infl uence the government 
in its trade policy choice. By avoiding the external competition, local fi rms 
capture a higher share of domestic market, which increases total profi ts. Owners 
of capital have a common interest in doing that, so they may choose to join 
forces for political activity. As in Grossman and Helpman (1994) setting, it is 
assumed that capital owners can overcome the free-rider problem that arises 
in collective actions and organize themselves into an interest group.
The lobby that represents the interest of capital owners makes po-
litical contributions contingent on the tariff imposed by the government. 
CIG(τ) denotes the contribution schedule offered by the interest group. The 
lobby chooses the optimal level of the contribution maximizing its total net 
welfare VIG=WIG−CIG. The gross welfare is given by:
(9)
where IIG is total labor supply of capital owners, πi  is the profi t of a fi rm 
that produces a particular variety i, αIG  is the fraction of the voting pop-
ulation that owns capital and belongs to the lobby, R(τ) = Ir(τ) is the total 
tax revenue, S(P(τ))=Is(P) stands for the aggregate consumer surplus, and I 
represents total population in the small economy. 
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), the government is interested 
in both the level of contributions and in the well-being of individuals. The 
incumbent cares about the total amount of contributions because they are a 
potential source of economic funds to fi nance campaign spending; contribu-
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tions may also provide other direct benefi ts to politicians.12  The well-being 
of the society is of concern to the government because individuals, as voters, 
are more likely to re-elect a government that has taken actions to improve 
their standard of living. Hence, the linear objective function that reveals the 
government’s preferences just equals to:
(10)
where θ is the weight that government attaches to the society’s welfare rela-
tive to the amount of campaign contributions and W is the aggregate welfare 
given by:
(11)
I is the total income of labor factor since w=1. Aggregate welfare also com-
prises the total income of capital owners, the total tax revenue, because the 
incumbent government redistributes tariff revenue in the form of poll subsi-
dies, and the aggregate consumer surplus.
Political activity governs the scene of the short run. The model has 
the structure of the principal-agent problem. This situation arises when a 
principal attempts to persuade an agent to take an action that may be cost-
ly for the agent to perform. The political ingredient considers two kinds 
of actors. First, a single interests group, the principal, serves to coordinate 
campaign contributions and to communicate the political offers to the in-
cumbent. The lobby chooses its contributions maximizing the net welfare of 
its members; and contributions are linked to the trade policy implemented 
by the incumbent. Second, an incumbent government, the agent, maximizes 
its own objective function given by equation (10).13
The sequence of the model is as follows. The short-run setting is 
characterized by a two-stage non-cooperative game in which the lobby 
chooses its political contribution in the fi rst stage and the government sets 
the trade policy in the second. The short-run equilibrium gives the optimal 
12. Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubaşoğlu (2002) emphasize that in dictatorships the “other sort of bene-
fi ts” are the main reason why dictators are interested in contribution funds.
13. Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Chang (2005) allow for competition among many lobbies 
that represent interests of specifi c factor owners. As it will be noted in sub-section III.1, a single 
organized interest group is a special case, with similar predictions about the structure of protec-
tion that emerges in case where there is rivalry among interest groups.
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levels of contributions and trade policy, which is refl ected by a parameter 
that measures the level of freeness.
III. Tඁൾ ඌඁඈඋඍ-උඎඇ ൾඊඎංඅංൻඋංඎආ
III.1 The endogenous protection
Grossman and Helpman (1994) assume that the interaction between 
lobbies and the government takes the form of a menu auction in the sense 
of Bernheim and Whinston (1986). Bernheim and Whinston (1986) develop 
a model that is adaptable to many cases in which a single individual is en-
dowed with the power to make a relevant decision and differently affected 
agents offer rewards in an attempt to obtain their most preferred outcome. 
In lemma 2, authors characterize the set of Nash Equilibria for fi rst-price 
menu auctions; proposition 1 of protection for sale is a characterization of 
the equilibrium to the particular case of a trade policy game in which the 
economic structure features perfect competition within sectors and technol-
ogy is governed by constant returns to scale.
This paper follows the Grossman and Helpman (1994) approach as-
suming the same kind of interaction between the government and a single 
lobby. In this background, if the contribution function is differentiable and the 
equilibrium price maximizes both the welfare of the particular lobby and the 
government’s objective function, the lobby may choose a contribution that is 
locally truthful. Such a contribution schedule has the interesting property of 
indicating identical marginal changes in the contribution and in the lobby’s 
welfare when both changes are caused by a marginal change in the tariff, that is:
(12)
In equilibrium, truthful contributions induce the government to be-
have as if it were maximizing θW+WIG.14  In this case, the objective function 
of the government is characterized by a social welfare function that weights 
differently the members of society. Lobby’s members receive a weight of 
(1+θ) and individuals who are not organized receive a smaller weight,θ.  The 
fi rst order condition of this problem is:15
14. One can decompose total welfare by distinguishing welfare of not organized individuals from 
well-being of those who belong to the interest group.
15. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) have pointed out that the same trade policy outcome may arise when, 
instead of assuming a menu-auction problem, it is assumed a Nash bargaining game. 
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(13)
Equation (13) characterizes the equilibrium domestic tariff, and con-
sequently the equilibrium of domestic prices, of all varieties supported by 
the differentiable contribution function.
To look for the derivatives of the lobby’s welfare and the aggregate 
welfare with respect to the tariff, fi rst a fi nal expression for profi ts of a typ-
ical fi rm has to be calculated:
(14)
Equation (14) depends on optimal demands (equations 2) and the 
marginal cost, i.e.                         . 
Hence, after replacing in equation (14) all expressions, and considering 
the fact that the market clears when                                      , fi rm’s profi ts are 
equal to:
(15)
where μ* represents the expenditure on all differentiated goods in the 
large economy. Equation (15) can be expressed in terms of the spatial
 distribution of expenditure,                 and                          where 
                              is the total  world expenditure in varieties, and in terms
 of the given spatial distribution of industry,                .16
(16)
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16. The assumption of 1 unit of capital per fi rm implies that the total number of fi rms equals the total 
the total stock of physical capital in the world.
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The marginal changes in aggregate welfare and in lobby’s welfare 
due to a marginal change in the tariff are given by the sum of the marginal 
changes in profi ts, total tax revenue and aggregate consumer surplus. As 
it is expected, the marginal policy change positively affects profi ts. Such 
change has two different impacts in tax revenue. On the one hand, a positive 
direct effect which refl ects the fact that when the tariff changes, the income 
revenue changes in the same direction for a given level of imports. On the 
other hand, an indirect negative effect, which shows the change in import 
quantities as the tariff is modifi ed. Finally, the effect of the marginal tariff 
change on the aggregate consumer surplus is, of course, negative.
Replacing the impacts of the tariff change on profi ts, on the total 
tax income and on the aggregate consumer surplus into equation (13), the 
following expression arises in the short run:
(17)
Equation 17 can be written in terms of a freeness parameter as:
(18)
where ϕ = τ1-σ represents a measure of freeness that takes values between 
zero and one. As τ increases, ϕ tends to zero. By contrary, when differentiated 
goods are almost traded freely, ϕ is near to one. If trade were completely 
free, t = 0; however, in this setting with monopolistic competition, when 
the incumbent maximizes the general welfare, the outcome is a second best 
optimal tariff. Therefore, the level of freeness would tend to be less than one.
Equation (18) cannot be solved in general for the degree of freeness, 
ϕ, since such level in the left hand side has different powers in each term. 
The left hand side (henceforth LHS) of equation (18) can take positive, null 
or negative values. It takes positive values for admissible values of σ > 1 
and 0 < sn< 1. The higher the value of σ, the higher the probability that the 
LHS expression is positive for a particular sn. For small values of sn, the LHS 
expression can still be positive; however, as sn tend to zero, it tends to be 
negative. A necessary condition for the LHS of equation (18) to be positive 
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17. This condition does not hold for values of   near to zero and values of  near to one.
18.  Annex B presents the derivations of comparative statics.
19. The negative impact that the tariff has in consumer surplus is multiplied by the total number of 
people that belongs to the lobby.
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is that                                                              (C1).  If the left hand side (LHS) is 
positive, as ϕ increases, the LHS increases. A suffi cient condition for this 
positive relation is that                           (C2).17 Though one cannot obtain from (18) 
a fi nal expression to measure the level of protection, it might be interesting 
to consider the LHS as a proxy of the inverse of such measure and analyze 
how it is infl uenced by political and economic variables. Some constructive 
predictions arise from this approximation.18
Like one of the relevant outcomes of the Grossman-Helpman ap-
proach, equation (18) confi rms that when the incumbent has a remarkable 
concern for the well-being of the society, it will avoid creating an important 
excess burden via the introduction of a high tariff. Hence, for a high value 
of θ, the LHS of equation (18) will also be high.
As the share of voters who are members of the interest group in-
creases, the level of trade freeness also increases. Though this prediction 
is also present in Grossman and Helpman (1994), its explanation here is 
somewhat different. In a setting in which many lobbies interact, the fact that 
lobbies want to increase the domestic price of their goods but to lower the 
prices of the other goods in order to avoid the excess burden as consumers 
generates a competitive mechanism that makes lobbies’ actions to neutralize 
each other. Here, with only one interest group as principal, the competition 
effect is absent. However, the members of the lobby, as consumers, also 
want to avoid the high social cost of a protective tariff. The deadweight loss 
that the lobby faces increases as the share of population who belongs to 
the lobby increases.19  However, the extra profi ts that the group as a whole 
obtains with the tariff implementation do not change with changes in αIG. 
The negative effect of the tariff on the lobby’s welfare could be relatively 
more important than the positive effect of the extra benefi t for high values of 
αIG. The incentive to lobby for a tariff diminishes as the share of individuals 
that belongs to the interest group increases. Hence, the optimal trade policy 
for the government might be one which is near to the second best optimal 
tariff that such government would choose when maximizes general welfare.
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When αIG = 1 , the LHS equals to                                , which is positive 
since by assumption  σ > 1. If αIG   0, the fraction of population that owns 
capital is very low. The LHS is positive when             (C3) holds. In this 
case, a high level of free trade is the probable outcome when the demand 
elasticity is relatively high and the government is well concerned about gen-
eral welfare.20
Though lobbies would persuade the government to introduce a tariff 
when demand elasticity is high, the incumbent will follow the Ramsey rule 
when                                       (C4) holds. The political cost that government may 
bear increases with the excess burden that individuals have to face when the 
incumbent set a tariff and this burden is higher at higher demand elasticity. 
When θ>0 and θ and σ are high, condition (C4) holds. Moreover, though θ =0, 
the government would follow the Ramsey rule. A similar reasoning as the 
one explained in the previous paragraph applies. If the proportion of the 
society that belongs to the lobby is high, αIG, the lobby’s welfare will be 
more affected by the negative effect that the tariff imposes to its members 
as consumers than by the positive effect that members can derive as capital 
owners. Therefore, it is more likely that the government sets a wedge be-
tween the domestic and foreign prices when the demand elasticity is low, 
since the deadweight that the incumbent introduces in this case is lower.21 
The spatial distribution of fi rms also seems to infl uence the struc-
ture of protection in an economy.22 The relationship between the industry 
share and the inverse of the level of protection is a priori ambiguous. On the 
one hand, one might expect that concentration of fi rms in one region would 
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20. When the elasticity of demand is high, the deadweight loss is important.
21. The effect of the elasticity of substitution is not easy to visualize since such variable is also present 
in the LHS of equation (18). Chang (2005) does not present a defi nite relationship between trade 
policy and the elasticity of substitution, as well as does not hand an insight on the effect of mark 
up on the level of protection. Nonetheless, from equation (22) of Chang (2005), one would infer a 
positive relationship between the inverse of mark up and the level of protection obtained with an 
ad-valorem import tax.
22. Some caution have to be taken when one analyses the impact of sn on the level of freeness due 
to the fact that this variable is also present in the LHS of equation (18). However, interesting 
plausible insights rises from the following analysis presented in the text.
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refl ect the political power of the industrial sector since the gains that produc-
ers would obtain from an increase in protection would be magnifi ed by the 
number of fi rms. In this case, the lobby would have much to lose from free 
trade; hence, it would bid more actively for protection. On the other hand, 
the presence of a high number of fi rms in such economy involves a tough 
level of competition among fi rms that tends to lower the potential gains that 
capital owners would derive from the protectionist policy. In fact, when lo-
cal competition is important, foreign competition and the lobbying activity 
to avoid it become irrelevant. The relationship between a given industrial 
share and the level of freeness will be positive if the following inequality 
holds:
(C5)
If he sign of condition (5) is inverted, the relationship is negative. 
Finally, a particular distribution of industry might not infl uence the level 
of freeness when this level is too small, that is when the economy is almost 
closed. For levels of freeness near to zero, expression (18) approximates to:
(19)
where                   also measures the degree of trade freeness. In this case, 
the economic variables that affect the level of protection are the demand 
elasticity and the level of mark-up, which depends on demand elasticity. The 
protectionist government follows the Ramsey rule as long as σ > 2. Political 
variables impact in the level of protection in a similar manner as they do in 
the general case.
III.2 Political Contributions
The characterization of the equilibrium (equation 13) involves the 
fact that the interest group may offer contributions that are locally truthful.23 
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23. The consideration of truthful contributions restricts the set of Nash equilibria that emerge when 
contributions are assumed to be differentiable to the set of truthful Nash equilibria supported by 
truthful bids functions. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) have shown that a player can substitute a 
truthful strategy for a non-truthful one without facing any additional cost. Since these strategies 
are also coalition proof, the authors have argued that truthful Nash equilibria may be focal among 
the set of Nash equilibria.
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When the lobby plays truthful contributions, it will choose the maximum 
level of its net welfare in such a way that will induce the government to se-
lect the lobby’s most preferred trade policy. Since the lobby aims to increase 
its net welfare (BIG ), it will do it by diminishing the level of contribution 
until making the government be indifferent between the trade policies that 
it can choose. In this case, the incumbent has two alternative possibilities; it 
can select the lobby’s most preferred policy, τ° , or the one that maximizes 
general welfare. As it was mentioned above, when the government maximiz-
es general welfare, as there is a distortion in the economy due to the monop-
olistic pricing rule, it will choose a second best small tariff. This tariff, τW, 
will be lower than that the lobby prefer the most. The equilibrium campaign 
contribution that satisfi es the incumbent’s indifferent situation is equal to 
                                                                   . 
As Grossman and Helpman (1994) have pointed out, when there is 
only a single organized interest group, it contributes to the government an 
amount that is proportional to the excess burden that the equilibrium trade 
policy imposes on the society. The proportionality component is given by 
the relative weight that the incumbent set on general welfare. The excess 
burden is given by the sum of the gain in producer surplus when government 
chooses the lobby’s most preferred equilibrium tariff, the tax revenue that 
the government derives from such policy and the loss of consumer surplus 
as a result of the protectionist policy. In this case, the government payoff is 
equal to                                  , just the same to what the incumbent would derived 
if it were implemented a second best trade policy.
VI. Cඈඇർඅඎൽංඇ඀ Rൾආൺඋ඄ඌ 
This paper has aimed to explain how tariffs are endogenously deter-
mined within a background of imperfect competition. The model incorpo-
rates in an economic geography setting, the political standpoint of why gov-
ernments may select trade policies that are far from those that maximize the 
general well-being. Particularly, two different backgrounds are combined 
in order to characterize the political game and the economic structure. The 
Grossman and Helpman (1994) model has usefully served to characterize 
the political game due to the fact that, as it well known, it provides micro-
foundations for each payer’s behavior. The FC model has provided an eco-
nomic structure in which one of the two sectors competes monopolistically. 
Both models share the nicely feature of being relatively tractable; therefore, 
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these frameworks were selected as pillars to build a fi rst simple background 
that helps to understand how economic variables, that are relevant in a mo-
nopolistic competition structure, may determine the endogenous tariff.
As it can be expected, predictions derived from the infl uence of po-
litical variables are the same than those of derived in the Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) setting. All else given, a relevant government’s concern 
about the welfare of the general electorate will predict a high level of free-
ness. Though competition among lobbies is not present in this setting, as the 
share of voters who are members of the interest group increases, the level of 
trade freeness also increases. The deadweight loss that the lobby faces when 
a high tariff is implemented increases with αIG, but the extra profi ts that the 
group as a whole can derive do not change. When the negative impact in the 
welfare’s lobby becomes relatively more important than the positive effect 
of the extra benefi t due to the tariff change, the lobby does not contribute. In 
fact, as truthful contributions refl ect the marginal change in lobby’s welfare, 
a negative impact prevents the lobby to bid for protection.
Two new appealing insights come from the consideration of a mo-
nopolistic competition structure. Firstly, in this setting the interest group 
seems to be more worried to persuade the government to implement a high 
level of protectionism when it can charge a low mark-up. This insight is in 
line with the argument presented in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007); the 
authors explain the asymmetric incentive that makes interest groups to fi ght 
harder in order to avoid losses; the asymmetric appropriablity of rent is the 
reason for that.24  Secondly, the initial distribution of industry might also 
infl uence the structure of protection in an economy. On the one hand, the 
presence of a high number of fi rms in such economy involves a tough level 
of competition among fi rms that tends to erode the potential gains that capi-
tal owners would derive from the protectionist policy. In this situation, lob-
bying activity might become less fruitful. On the other hand, if the number 
of fi rms might refl ect a measure of lobby’s political power, a higher number 
of fi rms will magnify the potential gains from protection. Hence, the lobby 
would be more willing to bid for protection. When an economy is almost 
closed, the industry share is not a relevant variable in the determination of 
the trade policy.
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24. As authors explain, in an expanding industry, entry tends to erode those rents that may arise from 
persuading the government to set the lobby’s most preferred policy. Differently, in declining 
industries, sunk costs rule out entry as long as the rents are not too high. In other words, there is 
an asymmetric appropriablity of rents.
105
V. Rൾൿൾඋൾඇർൾඌ
Baldwin, R., Forslid R., Martin P., Ottaviano G. and Robert-Nicoud F. (2003). Economic 
geography and public policy. PUP Princeton.
Baldwin, R. and Robert-Nicoud F. (2007). “Entry and asymmetric lobbying: why 
governments pick losers”. Journal of the European Economic Association, 
5 (5), 1064-1093.
Bernheim, B. Douglas and Michael, Whinston (1986): “Menu auctions, resources alloca-
tion and economic infl uence”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101,1-31.
Bombardini, M. (2008). “Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation”. Journal of 
International Economics, 75 (2), 329-348. 
Chang, PL. (2005). “Protection for sale under monopolistic competition”. Journal of 
International Economics, 66, 509-526.
Facchini, G., Olarreaga M., Silva P. and Willmann G. (2010). “Substitutability and 
Protectionism: Latin America's Trade Policy and Imports from China and 
India”. World Bank Economic Review, 24(3), 446-473.
Facchini, G., Van Biesebroeck J. and Willmann G. (2006). “Protection for Sale with Im-
perfect Rent Capturing”. Canadian Journal of Economics 39 (3), 845-873.
Gáname, M. (2005). “The effect of endogenous protection on the economic landscape”. 
Instituut voor Ontwikkelingsbeleid en –beheer (IOB-UA), Working Paper 
#01. Retrieved from : http://www.ua.ac.be/main.asp?c=*IOBE&n=4267&ct=
001595&e=o74944.
Gawande, K. and Bandyopadhyay U. (2000). “Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on 
the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection”. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 82 (1),139-152.
Gawande, K., Krishna P. and Robbins M. (2006). “Foreign Lobbies and U.S. Trade 
Policy”. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88 (3), 563-571.
Goldberg P. and Maggi G. (1999). “Protection for sale: an empirical investigation”. 
American Economic Review, 85(5), 1135-1155.
Grossman, G. and Helpman E. (1994). “Protection for sale”. American Economic 
Review, 84(4), 833-850.
Martin, P. and Rogers C. (1995). “Industrial location in public infrastructure”. Jour-
nal of International Economics, 39, 335-351.
Mitra, D.(1999). “Endogenous Lobby formation and endogenous protection: a long run model 
of trade policy determination”. American Economic Review, 89 (5),1116-1134.
Eඇൽඈ඀ൾඇඈඎඌ Pඋඈඍൾർඍංඈඇ ඐංඍඁංඇ ൺ ൿඋൺආൾඐඈඋ඄ ඈൿ ආඈඇඈඉඈඅංඌඍංർ...
Rൾඏංඌඍൺ ൽൾ Eർඈඇඈආටൺ ඒ Eඌඍൺൽටඌඍංർൺ | Vඈඅ. LII | N° 1| (2014) | ඉඉ. 87-112 | ISSN 0034-8066 | e-ISSN 2451-7321
106
Mitra, D., Thomakos D. and Ulubaşoğlu M. (2002). “Protection for sale in a devel-
oping country: democracy versus dictatorship”. Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 84(3), 497-508.
Ossa, R. (2013). “Trade Wars and Trade Talks with Data”. Mimeo, University of Chi-
cago Booth School of Business. Retrieved from: http://faculty.chicagobooth.
edu/ralph.ossa/research/trade%20wars.pdf.
Aඇඇൾඑ A
The Footloose Capital Model: The spatial distribution of fi rms
As it was mentioned above, the endogenous level of protection is 
derived by considering the spatial distribution of fi rms as given; hence, the 
background allows for a short-run analysis. NEG models take into account 
the possibility of factor mobility; this consideration is crucial in defi ning the 
spatial distribution of economic activity in the long run.
The FC model assumes capital services move from one region to an-
other in the long run. Unlike in the short run, capital owners can offer their 
capital services in every region, looking for the highest nominal reward.25  In 
this context, the long run equilibrium is only achieved when capital owners 
have not incentive to continue offering capital services in the other region. 
This situation happens either when capital earns the same retribution in both 
regions or when such factor is agglomerated in one of the two regions and 
this region pays the highest (and only) reward. In other words, one can visu-
alize two types of long run equilibria; the interior ones which equalize profi ts 
between regions, π = π*, or the core-periphery outcomes in which sn= 0  and 
π < π* or sn= 1 and π > π*. Focusing in interior outcomes, the equilibrium 
division of industry equals to:
(A1)
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25. Although capital services are perfectly mobile in the long run, the FC model assumes capital 
owners are completely immobile across regions. Thus, owners spend their incomes in the re-
gion where they live. This assumption prevents the model from displaying circular causality, an 
important characteristic of most NEG models. Though this absence makes the FC model totally 
tractable, it brings the disadvantage of losing the self-reinforcing mechanism that is present in 
other economic geography models.
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where                       characterizes the foreign level of freeness, which is consid-
ered as an exogenous variable. Equation (A1) shows the positive relationship 
between the share of industries located in the small economy and the spatial 
distribution of expenditure in differentiated goods. Such relation refl ects the 
fact that a high market size in one region tends to encourage concentration of 
fi rms in that economy. The process involves the interaction of two opposite 
forces. On the one hand, monopolistic fi rms desire to locate their production 
in the largest market in order to increase their sales and profi ts and to export 
to small ones, when trade barriers are present. Such behavior is a distinctive 
characteristic of the monopolistic industry and defi nes the so-called mar-
ket access effect, which is an agglomeration force. On the other hand, fi rms 
want to avoid competition locating their production in regions in which there 
are fewer competitors. This effect is called the market crowding effect and 
represents a dispersion force. Both forces make up the home market effect 
which highlights the outcome that for an exogenous change in the share of 
market size, the relocation of fi rms is more than proportional to that exoge-
nous change, that is
The home market effect depends crucially on the levels of freeness 
of the home economy and the rest of the world. When protection diminishes 
and both economies become freer in terms of trade, the home market ef-
fect becomes more powerful. The reduction in protection weakens the two 
forces, the market access advantage and the market crowding disadvantage. 
However, the fall in the tariff weakens the dispersion force at a higher speed 
than it weakens the agglomeration force. Hence, freer trade magnifi es the 
degree of relocation of fi rms; capital becomes more footloose as the level 
of trade freeness increases. Algebraically, these effects can be shown by the 
following partial derivatives:
                                       and                                              (A2)
The reasoning behind this argument is that as trade gets freer, com-
petition from fi rms that are located in the other economy becomes as impor-
tant as domestic competition. The market crowding disadvantage of being 
in the larger market turns into an irrelevant problem. Hence, the incentive to 
Eඇൽඈ඀ൾඇඈඎඌ Pඋඈඍൾർඍංඈඇ ඐංඍඁංඇ ൺ ൿඋൺආൾඐඈඋ඄ ඈൿ ආඈඇඈඉඈඅංඌඍංർ...
Rൾඏංඌඍൺ ൽൾ Eർඈඇඈආටൺ ඒ Eඌඍൺൽටඌඍංർൺ | Vඈඅ. LII | N° 1| (2014) | ඉඉ. 87-112 | ISSN 0034-8066 | e-ISSN 2451-7321
1* *   
 
  
1 *
1
1 1 *
n
μ
s
s
    
 2
1 0
1
HME     2
1 0
* 1 *
HME   
108
relocate capital factor from one region to the other in order to avoid competition 
vanishes; competition is not very much localized for low tariff barriers. The 
advantage of producing in the larger market, the market access effect, also 
erodes as the level of freeness increases since fi rms can have access to all 
markets when barriers are dismantled.
This paper has endogenously determined the level of protection 
in the small economy. Though an extended formal background should be 
considered to explore how political variables would impact on the spatial 
distribution of fi rms, one can intuitively follow a path of reasoning to have 
a roughly fi rst notion. Since the level of freeness depends on political and 
economic variables and the home market effect depends on this level, one 
can deduce implicitly that impact in terms of such variables:
(A3)
Hence, intuitively, when the government has a valuable concern on 
the well-being of individuals, the share of voters who are members of the 
interest group, the mark-up and the constant elasticity are high, the home 
market effect would become powerful since the level of freeness tends to 
be relatively high. An exogenous positive change in the market size would 
trigger a more than proportional change in the location of industry.
An interesting issue arises when one considers the initial spatial dis-
tribution of industry. The home market effect may be affected by the initial 
share of fi rms, i.e.     since, as it was mentioned above, it affects the level of 
freeness. However, the direction of such impact is a priori not determined. 
If condition (C5) holds, a high initial share will reinforce the home market 
effect. When the economy is almost closed, the initial distribution of industry 
does not impact on the home market effect.
Equation (A1) shows that the location of industry depends not only 
on the market size but also on other variables. The fi rst expression in the RHS 
of equation (A1) is indeed related with the level of freeness. Hence, the total 
impact of the level of freeness on spatial location is given by the following 
expression:
(A4)
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When trade costs are asymmetric, they affect differently the location 
of industry. In fact, a high level of protection in one economy creates a posi-
tive profi t gap that favors such economy. The difference in profi ts stimulates 
capital to fl ow from the region with high level of freeness to the other, with 
high level of protection. While the level of freeness in the home economy 
negatively affects the share of local industries, the level of freeness in the 
foreign economy affects positively the industry share of the local region:
     (A5) 
A government that scarcely weights the welfare of individuals in the 
short run and set a high tariff will induce a relocation of fi rms to its economy 
in the long run. Such relocation in favor of the relatively closed country is 
also probable when capital owners who are part of the lobby are few, the 
mark-up that fi rms can charge is low and the demand of varieties is relatively 
inelastic. Moreover, the likelihood of such relocation increases when the for-
eign country is a freer trader.
The market size
Since market sizes are also relevant variables that defi ne the eco-
nomic landscape between different countries, it is a useful task to fully 
characterize them. Market shares are defi ned by the total income that local 
individuals spend on differentiated goods in each market in terms of total 
world spending on such goods. In the quasi-linear utility function (equation 
1) the intensity parameter, μ, which reveals the preferences for varieties, is 
assumed to be common to all individuals in each region. However, though 
identical inside each country, it may differ across them; μ ≠ μ* . Hence, the 
total spending on differentiated goods is simply Ξ = Iμ in the home region 
and  Ξ* = I*μ* in the foreign country, and the sum of both represents total 
world spending on differentiated goods, ΞW. The local market size is therefore
   
      and the foreign market size is equal to                            .26
As it was mentioned in section II, in every region each individual is 
endowed with one unit of labor and possible one unit of capital; accordingly, 
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26. The quasi-linear structure of preferences implies that income effects are absent; hence consumer 
spending on differentiated goods is independent of income.
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the home population equals the number of labor, I = L. Labor force in the home 
economy can be expressed in terms of world labor endowment, L=sLLW, where 
LW = L + L* and sL= L / LW. Relative home market size is therefore:
(A6)
Equation (A6) expresses the relative market size of the home econ-
omy in terms of its share of world labor and the ratio of the intensity pa-
rameters. The more skewed local individuals’ preferences on differentiated 
goods relatively with those of the foreign economy,                 , the bigger relative 
home market size. Also, a higher share of labor factor involves a higher market size.
What means “small economy”?
It has been used the term “small economy” without precisely defi ning 
in terms of what parameters the economy might be considered small. The 
small economy term was used to highlight the existence of some kinds of 
asymmetries in the model, beyond the one that exists in trade costs, without 
explicitly specifying which asymmetries were taken place.
As in other NEG models, in the FC setting uneven economies may 
arise because of differences in market size and factors endowments. The 
domestic economy can be small due to the fact that its relative market size 
is low, sμ < 1/2 . Equation (A6) defi nes the market share in terms of the 
intensity ratio of preferences and the labor share of world labor endowment. 
Therefore, a low relative market size can be the result of a relative lower 
expenditure on differentiated goods by local individuals, a small population 
in the home country, or both. The economy also might be small in terms of 
the capital endowment, i.e. sk < 1/2 .
When differences between regions are the outcome of differences 
in market share, a small size spurs fi rms to locate in the larger region; the 
market access advantage operates in favor of the rest of the world. However, 
the small economy has the advantage of being the region in which fi rms 
face less competition. A dispersed equilibrium is the likely result when trade 
costs are high since the small region protects pretty well its industry from 
competition coming from the large region. As equation (A4) shows, though 
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a lower trade cost boosts the impact of sμ  on sn , since sμ < 1/2 ; such impact 
does not predominate in the determination of the geographical distribution 
of fi rms. There is a process of delocation of fi rms from the small region 
to the large one as the tariff falls. The political game can prevent such a 
delocation when the local lobby has the incentive and succeeds in the short 
run to persuade the government to set a high tariff, or when the incumbent 
scarcely cares about the general welfare, or both.
If the economy is small in terms of capital endowment, an interesting 
issue to analyze is whether the region is an importer or exporter of such factor. 
The difference between the share of employed capital, sn, and the spatial 
distribution of capital owners, sk, gives the direction of capital fl ows. The 
small economy hosts foreign capital when the following inequality holds:
(A7)
Because of similar arguments as those expressed above, this situa-
tion is likely to occur when the local government implements a high tariff, 
when the foreign government follows a free trade policy and when the small 
economy is not too small in terms of the market size.
Aඇඇൾඑ B
The Comparative Statics Analysis 
The effect of the weight government attaches to the well-being, θ, on 
the proxy of the level of freeness (LHS of equation 18) is:
(B1)
Similarly, total differentiation of equation (18) with respect to the 
share of voters who belong to the interest group, αIG, is positive:
(B2)
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The inverse of mark up (IMU) also impacts on the proxy of the level 
of freeness; as  IMU = (σ - 1)/ σ increases, the proxy expression diminishes 
since:
(B3)
The own price and substitution elasticities are represented by only 
one parameter, σ:
(B4)
Government will follow a modifi ed Ramsey rule if expression (B4) is 
positive; hence condition (C4) is derived by taken into account that ∂LHS/∂σ >0, 
which implies:
(Condition (C4))
Finally, the impact of the share of fi rms on the proxy level of free-
ness equals:
  (B5)
When ∂LHS / ∂sn >0, the following inequality holds:   
(Condition (C5))
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